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AN INTERACTIVE APPROACH TO 
PENSION FUND ASSET MANAGEMENT 
An unprecedented dilemma confronts today's pension asset manager. Tradi-
tionally, most of these managers believed that the ability to select underval-
ued securities was the secret to earning high returns. Accordingly, funda-
mental securities analysis prevailed as the predominant investment management 
theory for use in portfolio construction. 
Recently, however, another school has emerged that presents. a robust 
challenge to the very foundation of fundamental analysis. Many academicians, 
backed by elaborate computer documentation, contend that securities markets 
have become so fiercely competitive that one no longer can find undervalued 
securities. This "efficient market hypothesis" (EMH), one of the main tenets 
held by many subscribers to modern portfolio theory (MPT), asserts that secu-
rities are priced "fairly," and thus in the long run an investor cannot make 
above-average profits without being exposed to a corresponding high risk of 
loss.l 
Both fundamental analysis and MPT claim numerous devoted followers, and 
it is generally recognized that the subscription to one theory precludes the 
belief in the other. So wher~ does this place the pension fund manager? 
Charged on the one hand with the responsibility of prudently managing fund as-
sets and on the other confronted· with the choice between two conflicting in-
vestment theories, the perplexed manager often does not know which direction 
to turn. If he adopts the fundamental analysis approach, he may be attempting 
to achieve a higher than average return while exposing his fund to higher than 
tolerable risk. But if he adheres to MPT, he foregoes the possibility of 
earning abnormally high returns since his role is confined merely to selecting 
the proper risk/return tradeoff and diversifying to attain that relationship. 
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In this article. we shall demonstrate that, unlike popular belief sug-
gests, fundamental securities analysis and MPT are not necessarily incompat-
ible. In fact, we introduce a hybrid action strategy that is based on a syn-
thesis· of the pertinent. features of both fundamental analysis and MPT. This 
strategy, called Interactive Portfolio· Management (UM), gives rise to. a uni-
fied management approach that relieves the manager from the difficult and lim-
iting decision of choosing between two opposing theories, thus allowing him to 
concentrate on the task at hand -- optimizing the pension plan's investment 
performance• In order to better understand this asset management theory, it 
will be valuable to first trace the plight of the pension manager. 
Until the 1970's, pension· fund asset managers had more: flexibility than 
virtually any other type of investor. They were· unfettered by cUttlbersome laws 
and, due to tax exemption, free· to switch among assets without regard to tax 
consequences. Their long-term investment horizon enabled them to seek higher 
returns in more aggressive, less· liquid assets. At the same time, the· stock 
market was experiencing one of its longest and most dramatic "bull"' movements. 
From the end of World· War II to year-end 1970, common stocks yielded an 18 
percent comp.ound annual. return (cash dividends plus price appreciation),. al-
most fourfold the rate of inflation over that same period. 2 One can easily 
see why many investors viewed equities as the "perfect inflation hedge." 
Pension investmentmanagers recognized the potential: benefits of common 
stock ownership. Many managers. aggressively accumulated. stocks, realizing 
that continued high returns from these securities would reduce the amount of 
money the companymust. expend to satisfy its pension obligations. As are-
sult, private pensions' holdings of corporate equities, which totaled less 
than one billion dollars in 1945, surged to over $67 billion by 1970, 
representing approximately two-thirds of total pension assets.3 Many com-
panies ,. in effect, relied on the performance of their pension's equity port-
folio to subsidize corporate contributions. 
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Most asset managers used fundamental securities analysis to select in-
trinsically undervalued stocks,. believing that eventually these securities 
would be "recognized" and thus propelled to higher prices. A securities ana-
lyst prepares an estimate of intrinsic value by multiplying his estimate of 
the stock's earnings per share times an appropriate earnings multiplier. If a 
stock's market price is below its intrinsic value, it is underpriced and 
should be bought and held in order to reap future capital gains. In this 
sense, fundamental analysis concentrates primarily on the expected· return of a 
security, sometimes devoting only cursory attention to the riskiness of the 
security. 
As the stock market continued to prosper, an increasing number of pension 
managers became confident that the selection of intrinsically undervalued 
stocks was the . most effective asset management approach. Attention continued 
to be focusedon the generousexpected return potential of equities; few both-
ered to consider the risk that stocks. might relinquish some· of their mounting 
price gains. Prosperity abounded among equity-oriented pension managers. 
But unfortunately the· environment for the pension asset manager changed. 
The 1970's, in particular, were significant for three reasons: (1) the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) was ushered in, (2) the 
stock market nose-divedapproximately 40 percent during 1973-1974, and (l) the 
emergence ofMPT threatened the existence of traditional securities analysis. 
Each of these important occurrences and its impact on the pension asset man-
ager is initially examined. Then we present the interactive pension asset 
management approach - one that incorporates the key features of traditional 
securities analysis, yet is responsive to the heightened fiduciary responsi-
bility confronting managers and the increased emphasis placed on gauging the 
relative riskiness of alternative investment assets. 
Advent of ERISA 
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Pension managers, as well as other fiduciaries, for years have been re-
quired to exercise good judgment, or prudence as the legal profession labels 
it, in their investment decisions. As distantly as 1830, the courts defined a 
fiduciary's responsibility in managing funds "to observe how men of prudence, 
discretion and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to specu-
lation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering 
the possible income as well as the probable safety of the capital to be in-
vested."4 Until 1974, a fiduciary continued to be required to perform like a 
man of ordinary prudence in dealing with his own property. 
However, the passage of ERISA in 1974 significantly changed prudence de-
mands. A stringent new standard emerged mandating that fiduciaries act "with 
the care, skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances then prevail-
ing that a prudent man acting in like capacity and familiar with such matters 
would use in conducting an enterprise of like character and like aims. ·• 5 In 
other words, the criterion for comparison is now not what a prudent private 
investor would do with his own investments, but what. the professional pension 
manager would do under like circumstances. In essence, ERISA invokes a pru-
dent "expert" standard, replacing the prude!'lt man criterion. It turns the 
limelight on a basis of comparisons -- handling a pension fund by knowledge-
able people using the highest techniques of asset management applicable to 
pension funds. 
The implications of ERISA's new prudence requirements are striking. 
Since fund managers are now personally liable for losses caused by imprudent 
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decisions, many may elect to invest more conservatively, placing less emphasis 
.on riskier equities and paring overall risk by subscribing to the principle of 
asset diversification. 
Stock Market Collapse 
. At approximately the same time that ERISA appeared, stocks were experi-
encing the worst "bear" market since the days of the Great Depression. Pen-
sion managers, who had. grown accustomed to the buoyant stock returns of the 
'fifties and 'sixties, were heavily committed to equities --especially those 
of large growth companies. Many managers theorized that no matter how much 
you paid for one of these elite issues, you would eventually prosper because 
growth would always bail you out. As a result, prices of growth stocks esca-
lated to dizzying heights. · In 1972, stocks of companies such as Avon, Disney 
and Polaroid, for example, sold at exorbitant prices in excess of 80 times 
earnings. "Pte 1973-74 market collapse was especially cruel to. these institu-
tional favorites.. By 1974, Avon, Disney and Polaroid had lost more than 
eighty percent of their peak market values. Even regal IBM, the epitome of a 
"one-decision" stock (you only buy them), had more than half of its value 
lopped off. 
The market decline severely reduced pension fund values and significantly 
shook asset managers' confidence in equities. Furthermore, coming on the 
heels of ERISA, the stock market. retreat causedmany managers to reassess 
their attitudes toward risk. They realized that under ERISA increased risk in 
plan assets translated into more personal risk. However, no generally ac-
cepted measure of an asset's riskiness existed. Thus, pension managers were 
caught in the teeth of a very frustrating dilemma. On one hand, they desired 
to optimize the risk/return balance of their portfolios, but on the other 
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hand, they had no satisfactory way toquantify risk. Fearful that they might 
be challenged for exposing a plan to excessive risk, many managers took the 
path of least resi.stance -- they minimized risk by concentrating their acqui-
. si.tions to low risk alternatives suchc as high-grade bonds and money market 
instruments. Others· sti.ll purchased equities, but in a manner that "indexed" 
their portfolios to the market -- thus ensuring that they would never under-
perform the market (nor, for that matter, would they ever beat it). 
The combination of ERISA's more stringent attitude toward risk-taking and 
the unsettling experience of a major stock market decline apparently caused 
many pension asset. managers to become very risk averse --possibly handicap-
ping, their plans.' long-run productivity.. A notion existed: that the riskier an 
asset, the greater should be its return, but with no detailed specifications 
concerning how· one· ought to view risK;-
Emergence of MPT 
Already frustrated by cumbersomenewERISA requirements and a broad-based 
stock market retreat, pension asset managers were further consternated by the· 
increasing attention that MPT was receiving. Until the arrival of MPT, most 
managers believed that the ability to. select undervalued securities would open 
the door to high stock market . gains. But MPT strongly challenges that funda-
mental belief. MPTdisciples observed that stock prices seemed to follow no 
predictable pattern. In this manner, a blindfolded baboon throwing darts at 
the financial pages of· the Wall Street Journal should, on average, be able to 
pick stocks as successfully as a professional portfolio manager. Even though 
this viewpoint appears very extreme, many researchers endorsed this so-called 
"random walk" theory, pointing out that this is really the way the securities 
markets should function. After all, if a stock's price reflects everything 
that is known about the security (past, present and future), then any new 
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informa.tion would' come as a complete surprise. And a surprise is just as 
likely to be an undesirable one as it is to be a pleasant one (or vice versa) •. 
As a result, if current. stock prices. reflect all known information, then price 
behavior, which responds only to new information, should be essentially ran-· 
dom•, The implication is obvious: if stock prices follow a kind of random 
walk, then it would be· fruitless to attempt to uncover presently undervalued 
stocks -- they simply do · not exist because the market is too efficient to per-
mit such an occurrence. 
The new theory goes even further: since individual stock price movements 
are unpredictableand random, the asset manager should strive to eliminate 
this type of undesirable firm-specific risk through diversification. The· 
diversification co.ncept may be portrayed by observing the indexing technique. 
An investor who. acquires a portfolio that exactly replicates a selected market 
indicator (the Standard & Poor's '500', for example) has obviously pegged or 
"indexed'• his portfoli-o's performance to that of the market. Since the· in-
dexed portfoli-o isthe· market, i-ndividual (firm-specific) risk is nonexistent 
only market risk remains. 
MPT hypothes·izes that a rational, risk-averse asset manager, desiring to 
achieve a· given expected return level, should construct the unique portfolio 
that possesses the lowest. degree of risk for that particular return object!*· 
This unique portfolio is known as an "efficient" portfolio. because no other 
combination of stocks can be devised tha.t produces the desired expected return 
level for as small a degree of risk. The only way to create an efficient 
portfolio is via diversification so that unnecessary firm-specific risk is 
eliminated. 
It is certainly not surprising that portfolio managers found MPT to be 
extremelyunnerving. If securities analysis is a futile practice (as market 
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efficiency implies),. then the very profession of the securities analyst is in 
jeopardy. Rather than actively managing a portfolio, the asset manager should 
assume a relatively passive posture -- making portfolio alterations only to 
change a portfolio's risk/return composition. Fortunately, a new risk gauge, 
the beta coefficient, emerged from MPT.6 Now the asset manager has a.specific 
tool for quantifying portfolio risk, thus mitigating some of the concern that 
was previously associated with portfolio risk measurement. 
How Efficient Is the Market? 
It becomes readily apparent that the increasing number of subscribers to 
the EMH implies greater suspicion of the merits of fundamental securities 
analysis. If markets are completely efficient, fundamentally over- or under-
valued securities do not exist. In recent years, however, . an expanding con-
tingency of researchers have questioned the validity of the EMH, asking "Are 
securities. in all markets efficiently priced . at all times?" A negative re-
sponse· to that query· would, of course, indicate that at some point. in time 
abnormal returns could be attained. 
In particular, several academicians challenged the EMH. As a result, 
many empirical studies designed to test market efficiency emerged. Some re-
searchers discovered persistent market anomalies which are inconsistent with 
the EMH assertions -- suggesting that abnormal returns, although very diffi-
cult to achieve, are indeed possible. One anomaly that has received consider-
able recent attention is the price-earnings (P/E) ratio effect. Recent 
studies reveal that, on average, portfolios consisting of low P/E stocks yield 
higher returns than justified by their underlying beta risk.7 The empirical 
analysis which follows confirms this anomaly. 
An Empirical Investigation 
In this study a sample of 125 randomly-selected industrial companies was 
analyzed to determine if the P/E effect. persisted during the. trying 1970's. 
Relevant return and accounting data were retrieved from the COMPUSTAT tapes. 
Initially the P/E ratio for acll sample firms was calculated quarterly from the 
beginning of 1970 to mid-year 1980. The stocks were ranked in ascending order 
by their respective P/E magnitudes so that the lowest quintile (Ql) includes 
firms with the lowest P/E . ratios and the highest quintile (QS) consists of the 
highest P/E's. The quarterly portfolio mean excess return for each quintile 
was then calculated. assuming an equal initial investment in each stock.s 
This procedure was repeated; at each quarter's end, thus providing 42 consecu-
tive· quarters of return data;. for each of the five PIE-ranked portfolios. 
Thus, the composition; of each portfolio was adjusted quarterly to reflect 
shifts in relative P/E rankings. 
The systematic risk coefficients (betas) were averaged across the firms 
within each portfolio· to estimate the portfolio's systematic risk (Bpt) in 
in period t ,. as follows: 
where npt is the number of stocks in portfolio pin period t. Each quarterly 
excess portfolio return (r'pt> was obtained by· averaging cross-sectionally the 
excess returns of the individual stocks belonging to the particular portfolio, 





In this; manner, the mean excess returns were· computed for each of the P/E. 
quintiles for a series of 42' consecutive quarters.. Finally,, the geome·tric 
mean excess return for each. P/E: quintile over the entire· 10 1/2 year period 
was. computed.. The results are shown in Exhibit 1. 
(Insert Exhibit l Here) 
Over· tha entire period'; . a significant P/E effect was detected. As in 
prior studies,. low P/E portfolios; were found .. to significantly outperform the 
average return. In fact, excess returns decline monotonically as portfolio 
average P/E increases. 'lhesefindings confirm that stock market anomalies 
continue: to• exist, even though the: institutionally-dominated markets . have no 
doubt become' more efficient in·. absorbing,. processing and reacting to· relevant 
information. 9' 
An Interactive Asset Management Approach 
In this section, we outline: anasset management approach based. on the in:-
teraction· and synthesis of fundamental analysis with MP'r. This interactive 
approach resol.ves: the basic conflict of the· asset manager. Three key princi-
ples wilL be synthesized. From .fundamental. analysis we draw · upon the idea of 
the existence· of market anomalies in a nearly efficient market.. From MPT we 
will apply two crucial notions. 'lhe first is the idea of an objective risk 
measure, beta.. 'lhe second is the concept of eliminating individual stock risk 
via proper diversification •. Thesethreeprinciples. blended into an action 
st.rategy comprise Interactive Portfolio. Management (IPM). 
Since several empirical studies have detected. market inefficiencies, it 
follows that the securities analyst may not be as obsolete as the EMH asserts •. 
But these same studies also reveal that market inefficiencies are scarce and ' 
difficult to uncover. An aggressive, knowledgeable analyst may be able to 
discover: intrinsically undervalued· securities·, but it certainly is not easy. 
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Thus, the job of today's portfolio manager becomes somewhat clearer. In 
a "nearly" efficient market it is prudent to rely on the advice of superior 
securities' analysts because it is reasonable to assume that in the long run 
these top-notch analysts can detect securities that are intrinsically 
misvalued. This, in turn, indicates that the use of fundamental analysis is 
still a viable alternative- for the asset manager - a nearly efficient market 
provides enough investment opportunities to justify the securities analyst's 
existence. 
The empirical evidence cited earlier in this article reveals that low P/E 
stocks provided abnormally .generous rates of return during the 1970-1980 peri-
od. This anomaly is inconsistent with the notion that the securities markets 
are totally efficient, but are compatible with the idea of nearly efficient 
markets. One would thus think that the purchase of low P/E issues would be a 
prudent way for the asset. manager to construct an attractive portfolio. Un-
fortunately it is not that simple. because the creation of a portfolio in this 
manner virtually ignores the concept of risk. Whereas such a portfolio might 
have a very high return expectation, it could also possess a very large degree 
of risk --more than the plan beneficiaries are willing to tolerate.10 A 
major criticism of fundamental analysis revolves around its purportedly inade-
quate treatment of portfolio risk. 
This is substantiated by a further look at the results of Exhibit 1. 
Note that for the lowest P/E stocks, the average beta levels are significantly 
above 1.0. This means that diversified portfolios consisting of low P/E se-
curities could indeed expose the asset manager to high risk.. The portfolio 
would yield expected returns above those warranted by its risk; nevertheless, 
the risk of the portfolio could be substantially greater than the market risk. 
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Exhibit 1 implies that higher than justified returns.· are achieved at the 
expense· of' high. risk, a . very serious: drawback. To test the validity· of this, 
a : second empirical experiment was performed. In this experiment all low P/E 
stocks were classified into- five beta risk categories. Quintile I contains 
the 20%·· least. risky stocks,. qUintile 2: the 20% least risky stocks and so on. 
The same 42 quarters were used with the returns compounded over this period. 
All returns were then adjusted in accordance with their beta risk levels. 
This experiment should reveal whether it is necessary to select high risk 
stocks in order to achieve excess returns. Exhibit Z presents these findings. 
First note that the risk-adjusted returns arevirtually the same for all. beta 
quintiles. Thi:s: confirms the· risk-return tennant of MPT. After adjusting. for 
riskF all returns should be the· same. Of course, the returns of high beta 
stocks are larger in the absolute•. (non:-risk-adjusted) sense. 
(Insert EXhibit 2 Here,) ' 
Exhibit 2 reveals a · dramatic. and' crucial. result: every beta quintile 
yields substantial excess returns> over the· average.. This means that low· P/E' 
stocks;. of any beta risk level produced' abnormally high returns. That is, re-
turns. higher than. the average · of stocks at that same beta level. Therefore,. 
i .t : is not necessary to hold only high risk stocks in. order to obtain excep-
tional performance. 
Although fundamental analysis has recently received· considerable empiri-
cal support.,. it nonetheless cannot be practiced in a vacuum. At this point. we 
introduce the concept of Interactive- Portfolio Management (IPM) --a blending 
of fundamental analysis and MPT. 
Fundamental analysis is designed to facilitate the selection of underval-
ued securities,. but it does not thoroughlydiscuss . howto package those indi-
vidual stocks.. Exhibit 3 illustrates that: a fundamental approach which 
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analyzes stocks' P/E ratios may be employed to select specific undervalued se-
curities. That same' Exhibit shows. that MPT should also enter the scene in 
order to enable the asset manager to package the individual. securities into an 
efficient portfolio.. This is the major departure from traditional portfolio 
management which primarily focuses on the selection of individual stocks, as 
opposed to the construction of an individual, efficient portfolio. 
(Insert Exhibit 3 Here) 
MPT mounts a head-on attack to the: problem of risko The theory contends 
that risk has two crucial components.. 'lhe first component, called unsyste-
matic or individual stock risk, can be reduced or even eliminated via divers:l-
fication, but thee second· component, known as systematic or market risk, is 
non-diversifiable.)1 An investor cannot escape systematic risk, bt;tt he can 
regulate its intensity by effective analysis. The degree of portfolio risk is 
measured by· the· portfolio's beta' which is merely a weighted average of the 
individual component: securities' betas .. 12 
Furthermore·, MPT assumes that investors: are risk ave·rse, i.e.,. f .or a de-
sired return level a rational. investor always prefers. the least. risky (effi-
cient) portfolio that: promises that return expectation. After determining the 
investor's risk tolerance level, the portfolio manager's task is to select the 
unique portfolio possessing that risk level with the highest possible return 
expectation. The adherence to MPT's risk quantification technique enables the 
asset manager to design a portfolio that has exactly the desired amount of 
systematic risk (unsystematic risk is not relevant since it can be diversified 
away). No longer· does the manager have to fear the consequences of not prop-
erly risk-designing a portfolio. 
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The Capital Market Line (CML) summarizes- the relationship between port-
folio- risk and return·, and in- this instance is; represented' by" the· line segment 
_RfMA. Point M' on the CML represents the overall market; thus, E(Rut) is the 
expected market return and am is the market's risk level. 13 If market effi-
ciency prevails,, _ portfolio M is the only portfolio of. risky securities which 
should be held -because it is the one portfolio which possesses zero unsystem-
ati'c risk. The line segment RfM indicates the various returns available 
through the combination of commitments in risk-free assets and risky assets as 
represented by the· market index.. In order to achieve an expected return 
greater than the market, some point along; that portion of the CML between M 
and: A, the· investor is· assumed able·· to -borrow at the- risk-free rate, and thus; 
. -
"leverage" the portfolio by reinvesting the borrowed funds in the market. 
(Insert Exhibit 4 Here) 
_In a ' world· of efficient markets, rational investors would always strive· 
to own . portfolios- falling along the- CML. -- all other possibilities would be· 
inefficient.. The relaxation of the EMil assumption,. however, could dramatical-
ly change:· investors} out.look. For· example" if one believes• that low P/E 
stocks,. on average, yield abnormally highreturns, then that individual may 
prefer to move off the CML. Such a . departure from the CML could be accom- t 
pl.ished by acquiring a diversified. portfolio consisting· of many low P/E firms •. 
This· acquisition of' undervaluedsecurites wouldcreate a . higher than normal 
return expectation... And, through proper diversification, unsystematic risk-
could be essentially negated. Market risk, of course, would still exist, but 
presumably only at a level approximatingthat of the overall market. In fact, 
the por.tfolio manager could monitor the portfolio's mean beta to ensure that· 
an average degree of systematic risk (6 =- l. 0) · emerges •. 
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This is the essence of IPM. In this manner, the new diversified portfo-
lio (denoted as point X in Exhibit 4) would replace the market index as a vi-
able combination of risky assets.l4 In fact, the market portfolio would no 
longer be a relevant alternative because at the same risk level it indicates a 
lower return expectation than does the new, anomaly-based portfolio. The 
superior portfolio of risky assets could be used in combination with the risk-
free asset to create a new CML (designated CML' in Exhibit 4) which would 
supersede the original CML. CML' is a graphic display of the results pre-
sented in Exhibit 2. Therefore, return expectations would be higher, but, due 
to diversification, unsystematic risk would be substantially eliminated, ba-
sically leaving only market risk exposure. The composite effect of IPM is to. 
provide the investor ahigher return expectation at each respective beta risk 
level. 
Putting it all together, the IPM strategy can be implemented by the 
following action steps: 
(1) Select a desired beta risk level for the portfolio. 
(2) Compile a master list of low P/E stocks and their respective betas. 
(3) Adjust the portfolio to obtain a broad diversification of stocks which re-
fleets the composition of the market. 
(4) Borrow or lend funds at the risk-free rate to adjust the portfolio's risk/ 
( 
return characteristics. 
(5) Review and rebalance the portfolio at regular intervals in order to main-
tain the necessary P/E, beta, and diversity traits. 
The procedure enables the asset manager to achieve any desired point along the 
CML' line of Exhibit 4 by synthesizing the key features of fundamental 
analysis and MPT. 
16 
Conclusion 
The:past decade was; fraught with change' for the typical pension fund 
ass.et manager. The broad-based stock market retreat, the rigid standards set 
forth by ERISA, and the emergence of MPTcombined to threaten the practice of 
. t .raditional asset. management. In particular, these changes collectively led 
to, an increased emphasis on the riskiness; of. assets --no, longer could return 
expectations be the· dominant consideration., Fearful of the adverse conse-
quences- of excessive risk exposure, some managers resorted to techniques such 
as indexing in order to avoid being criticized for taking too much risk.. In 
essence, the- pendulum shif.ted from return; consciousness to risk conscious-
This ' article asserts, that neither r .eturn nor risk should. be the predomi-
nant~ asset. management consideration~ Rather the prudent manager should place 
equal emphasis on each factor. An approach called Interactive· Portfolio Man-
agement is; introduced to .. capture the- important elements- of both expected re-
turn, and' risk'"' IPM is really nothing more· thana synthesise of the important 
features·: of tradi tiona! securities. anal~sis' and. modern portfolio theory, and 
as> such is: designed to enable the. manager. tor achieve· the highest return 
expectation for a given risk level.. In this manner, the skills of the superi-
or securities analyst are· still valuable for selecting undervalued securitiet;. 
But at. the same time the principles· of MPT are· meritorious· -- one should em-
ploy effective asset diversification among undervalued securitesin order to 
mitigate' overall portfolio risk •. 
· The· use of IPM: allows the asse.t manager to be responsive: to the major 
tenets of both fundamental securities analysis and MP'f. Thus, two seemingly 
contradictory theories areharmoniously blended to achieve a mutual objective . 
-- opt.imizing a portfolio's risk/ return. composition. 
EXHIBiT 1 
ANNUAL PORTFOLIO MEAN EXCESS RETURNS AND BETAS 
Portfolio P/E Ratio Ranking 
Quintile Excess Return Beta 
Q1 11.20 1. 05 
Q2 6.04 1.01 
Q3 -1.88 0.97 
Q4 -5.68 I. 00 




ANNUAL MEAN EXCESS RETURNS OF LOW P/E STOCKS 
Beta Quintile Excess Return Mean Beta 
Q1 10.93 0.78 
Q2 10. 9'7 0.95 
Q3 11.35 1. 04 
Q4 11.61 1 •. 13 
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